INTRODUCTION
The United Nations declared 2005 the International Year of Microcredit. 2 Arising in the Third World in the early 1970s, microcredit 3 developed as a means to provide extremely poor people, especially women, with access to credit and an alternative to charity. 4 Commenting on the significance of the resolution, Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the U.N. Development This Note explores applications of microcredit in the United States and suggests an approach to extend the benefits of such programs to a wider clientele by means of a program that is both novel and traditional: equity lending based on Islamic banking models. By effectively sharing the profits of fledgling businesses, microlenders who adopt an equity lending model can lower interest rates without substantially increasing lender risk, offer their services to more microentrepreneurs, and support their infrastructure through an influx of capital from their clients. This final benefit, in turn, allows the microentrepreneur to give back to the group of people who had the faith in her to make the original loan.1 5 This Note comprises three parts that analyze microcredit and its current application in the United States, and it suggests a method of interest reduction 5. Greenlights, supra note 2, at 1. 6. Id. Poverty; Millions, Particularly Women, Lifted Out of Extreme Poverty, Delegates Told, M2 PRESSWtRE, Oct. 10, 2003. 8. Greenlights, supra note 2, at 1. 9. Gordon Platt, Changes Urged in Microcredit Lending, Journal of Commerce, Sept. 15, 1999. 10. Millions Out of Poverty, supra note 4, at 1. 11. Platt, supra note 9, at 9. Incomes, Boosting Living Standards, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 24, 2003 ; see also, Platt, supra note 9, at 9 (noting that I billion of the 1.5 billion people living worldwide on less than $1 per day are women).
UN Under-Secretary General Lauds Effectiveness of Microcredit as Second Committee Takes Up Implementation of Decade for Eradication of

UN Second Committee Panel Discussion Hears Experts Underline Important Role of Microcredit in Raising Housing
13. Millions Out of Poverty, supra note 4, at 1.
The idea of microcredit arose in the Third World as a formalized version of traditional methods of credit extension.' 9 There are three overarching points to remember regarding microcredit: it is not new, it is not simply about money, and it is not enough. 20 In many circles, at least in the mid-to late-1990s, it was haled as a panacea to cure world poverty. 21 While it is a useful tool for combating poverty, both abroad and at home, microcredit has its limitations. 2 2 Small loans are a means by which people can bring themselves out of poverty, but such loans can only benefit those who are in a position to use them 23 productively. Thus, microcredit is not a means to assist the estimated 40.3 million people living with HIV/AIDS 24 or the world's 35.5 million refugees and displaced persons. 25 Moreover, some donor states might confuse the promise of microcredit with the need for aid, 26 thereby preventing organizations from serving those who might benefit most effectively. 2 7 Another important aspect of microcredit is the empowerment of women it engenders.
28 Ninety-four percent of the Grameen Bank's clients in Bangladesh are women. 29 By fostering this participation, microcredit allows women to develop financial autonomy, thereby promoting gender-equity and improving
Microfinance-Credit
Lending Models, at http://www.grameeninfo.org/mcredit/cmodel.html (last modified Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Lending Models] .
20. The Virtual Library on Microcredit: Documents and Reports, available at http://www.gdrc.org/icm/icm-documents.html (n.d.) (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) . Mean a Lot, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 1987 , at A26 (letter to the editor from an activist in the fight against world hunger in which the activist points to low default rates as proof that the poor are "bankable.").
See generally Kathy McKenna, Little Loans
22. See Microcredit's Limits, supra note 4, at 1. The United States and other donor nations should not "use this program as a substitute for other more basic ways of helping the poorest of the poor." Id. 30 Ironically, these successes are due, in part, to institutions like larger sponsor banks and corporations, which are not usually positively associated with social justice issues. 3 ' In fact, these institutions are considered to be "obstacles to women's empowerment., 32 
Microcredit Alone Won't Reduce
A. The Grameen Model
The Grameen 33 Banking Model was developed in Bangladesh by the economist Muhammad Yunus in 1977. 34 The first clients were stool makers. 35 These women used their loan to purchase raw materials, thereby breaking the cycle of subsistence caused by moneylenders charging high rates of interest. 36 Since its inception, the Grameen Bank has grown to the point of serving 1.8 million needy clients, lending $30 million per month.
3 7 Pointing to the high rates of repayment, critics within Bangladesh have called on Grameen to move closer to commercial banks and charge lower interest rates. 38 Inspired by the good news from Bangladesh, programs based on the Grameen model were established throughout the world. 39 Sponsored by nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and governmental aid programs, these programs appeared both in underdeveloped as well as highly industrialized nations.40 Muhammad Yunus's theory was that wherever there was poverty, microcredit could fight it. 41 The application of microcredit in American urban centers has been turbulent. 42 Gary Hattem, president of the Deutsche Bank Americas Foundation, for example, expressed concern that the publicity and excitement surrounding microcredit could burn itself out: "Microfinancing has to grow as an industry as a bottom-up strategy. The potential problem is too much enthusiasm and having it explode. 4 3 Another drawback to the American application is that there are many small microlenders " [w] 
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by an incessant search for funding... ."44 These lenders devote little time to improving effectiveness or growth. 45 As a result, more than 40% of American microlenders have annual budgets under $100,000, and these groups work in isolation and often duplicate each other's efforts.4
There are several theories to account for the success of microcredit. 4 7 First, the reliance on peer pressure or other social and religious norms prove to be as effective an incentive for repayment as traditional physical collateral. 48 Second, microlenders succeed where there is a "credit-conducive culture, ' 49 a theory tested in markets where there is a high degree of consumer credit and indebtedness, such as the United States. 50 Third, conventional financial wisdom may simply have miscalculated the need or profitability of microlending and the ability of the poor to repay their debts. 51 Furthermore, three factors have been advanced to account for the Grameen Bank's success in Bangladesh: it serves the extremely poor; it can be used by the poor, who are often illiterate and uneducated; and the rigidity of its rules prevents cooption and subversion by local elites. 5 2 Theories explaining the initial success of microcredit in the United States are explored below. 53 
1.
Grameen I
Under the original Grameen system, banks are responsible for territories of fifteen to twenty-two villages. 4 The bank workers familiarize themselves with the villagers and assess their needs. 5 5 Peer groups of five unrelated individuals 56 are formed from each of the villages. At this stage, these groups are potential borrowers. 58 Membership is limited to persons whose net worth is less than the equivalent of one-half acre of land. 9 Only two of the five are 44 62 The typical life of a Grameen loan is fifty weeks, which produces an interesting symbiotic effect between the borrowers and potential borrowers within the group. 63 During this time, the other members exert substantial pressure to guarantee that the original loans are repaid. 64 On the other hand, the economic benefit the borrowers derive serves as an incentive for the others to remain in the program. 6 5 Interest rates on Grameen loans range between sixteen6 and twenty percent.
67
Despite the greater individual isolation and potential mobility of poor urban Americans, this double mechanism of peer lending has also worked in the United States. 68 When pressed about delinquency rates, the director of Project Enterprise, a microcredit program operating in Harlem and Brooklyn, New York and serving a predominantly African American female clientele, indicated the project's total current default amount was $202, and that one client had been delinquent, "but we got the money in the end. It was not just a bank going after the money, it was her peers too.' 69 
2.
Grameen II
In 2002, Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank developed the Grameen Generalized System, commonly referred to as GGS, or Grameen 11.70 GGS was viewed as an adaptive improvement upon the original system. 7 ' It added four new characteristics to the original framework: loan flexibility, pension plans, self-guaranteed loan insurance, and the community star system. 7 
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from unforeseen crises, and insulating the bank from failure. 4 Under this new loan regime, borrowers who find themselves in financial straits can get a "rescheduled basic loan with its own separate set of rules. 7 5 While this innovation makes a certain amount of sense, critics have pointed to it as an example of bookkeeping legerdemain that inflates the touted repayment rates. 76 To the Bangladeshis in need of help, this criticism is irrelevant. It is important to keep in mind, however, that American microlenders do not necessarily practice this form of rescheduling, which in turn may contribute to higher default rates.
77
The second and third innovations are the introduction of pension plans and self-guaranteed loan insurance, the applicability of which to the urban American microcredit market will be explored elsewhere. 78 Basically, all Grameen borrowers with a loan greater than a certain fixed amount must contribute to a pension fund. 79 Unlike the American social security system, borrowers who contribute to the general fund are guaranteed a set amount after ten years when their pension account matures. 80 The rate of return is envisaged to be nearly 200%.81
Self-guaranteed loan insurance was developed to address the fear of borrowers that their debt might remain after they die. 82 Here, the borrower contributes 2.5% of the outstanding amount on the last day of each calendar year. 83 Should the borrower die during the following year, the debt is paid out of the general fund and the borrower's survivors are refunded all contributions to the fund the borrower made. 84 If the borrower outlives her loan, then the contributions are not refunded. 5 This, perhaps, serves as an incentive for the bank and its branches to take a greater interest in the community and work toward an increased standard of living for their villages. 82. This fear apparently arises primarily out of concern that the soul will not be at rest, rather than the more temporal fear that the family might be forced to assume the debt. 
B. Venture Philanthropy and the International Focus
In his address to delegates at a microcredit conference held in London, Muhammad Yunus proclaimed: "[Ploverty does not belong in a civilised human society. It belongs in museums. 9 8 While this sentiment is shared by activists, NGOs, and the United Nations, the costs involved in relegating poverty to the collective world memory are staggering. 9 It was estimated that $21.6 billion would be required to expand microcredit initiatives to the 100,000 poorest families by 2005.1°° As Carter Garber, a development consultant from the United States, points out, such a goal is a "very steep challenge."'' 1 1 In the period 1987 to 1997, microcredit proponents raised only five hundred million dollars in private funds. 10 ' ' 6 Domestically, a large amount of microcredit funding has gone to the assistance of refugee resettlement within the United States.°7 In fiscal year 2000, the Office of Refugee Relocation awarded $2,850,851 to develop and administer microenterprise programs for the benefit of refugees.1 08 These programs were intended not only to aid in the resettlement of newly arrived non-citizens, but also to aid refugees who have been in the United States for a number of years and who seek microcredit as a means to supplement their incomes.'09 This is not to gainsay the importance of such foreign investment; in fact, one proponent has suggested that microcredit, with its twin goals of economic opportunity and poverty alleviation, is the most effective way to wage a war against terrorism.' 0 Under the Clinton presidency, the Small Business Administration (SBA) expanded its microcredit initiatives."' By 1997, the SBA had awarded $70 million in grants to nonprofit organizations. 1 
Id.
[Vol. 16:2 economic policies:'
14
The Bush administration removed the Small Business Association from the cabinet and proposed cutting the agency's funding by over 20 percent. Worse, it aims to reduce the agency's lending capacity by 50 percent. [In 2002] , there is $9.4 billion available for small-business loans guaranteed by the agency. For [2003] , the administration is proposing less than $5 billion. 15
To fill this breach, a new force has emerged: the venture philanthropist. Under this paradigm, philanthropists are to "think like businesspeople." ' 16 They should seek out efficiency and innovation, and not merely cut a check to a worthy cause." 7 While the idea of using market forces to affect social change is "anathema" to some,'" 8 venture philanthropy has won some high profile proponents." 9 Of the approximately 3,000 microcredit programs operating worldwide, seventy percent serve fewer than 2,500 clients.
120 Part of what motivates private investors such as Vinod Khosla, co-founder of Sun Microsystems,' 2 1 are the images of personal triumph over poverty: "I was completely blown [away] as I listened to the stories of these tenacious women. . I started crying."' ' 2 2 As far as investment potential, microcredit programs might not be "as profitable as Google, but they have the same level of social impact."' 23 Such endorsements bring significant attention to microcredit, and investors such as Khosla afford microcredit programs to grow beyond the current levels. De Lesseps also stresses the satisfaction derived from aiding in the alleviation of world poverty. 2 9 Much of the excitement surrounding microcredit is not only its perceived novelty, but the promise that current efforts will "become one of the great humanitarian movements of history, allowing people to free themselves from the bondage of poverty. "' 130 As seen in the comments above, microcredit is widely viewed as a program with global, specifically Third World, applications. Microcredit in the United States remains in the early stages of its development.' 3 1 Venture philanthropy may not be able to provide the same support to U.S. programs as it can in nations such as Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. Venture capital generally retains an equity interest in the companies it funds, 132 which in turn might reduce local control and work against those characteristics which contribute to the success of urban microcredit, such as a sense of community and local responsibility. Microentrepreneurs and, more generally, consumers often face insurmountable hurdles in their quest for credit: they lack credit histories, their credit is poor, their income is low, or they have a high debt-to-income ratio.1 37 Furthermore, their needs are often so relatively small that the cost of application review, credit checks, and processing makes extending loans prohibitively expensive for traditional banks.
138 Banks usually do not make loans for less than $25,000. 139 Several legal and illegal options rise to fill the credit vacuum, all of which offer credit at great cost.'
40
This situation depresses the opportunities of the individual credit-seeker, the credit-seeker's family, and, in the aggregate, the credit-seeker's community.'
4 '
The lack of available credit is also poignantly felt among immigrants. 1
42
The situation has become increasingly difficult for legal immigrants, in particular, who face cuts in food stamps and restricted forms of social services and public services during the first five years of their residency in the United States.
143
For those immigrants wishing to start businesses but who are ineligible for microloans under the program offered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the Department of Health and Human Services, loansharks are often the only option.44 An entrepreneur in Williamsburg, New York reported 136. Non-profit and government entities in the United States prefer such terms as "microfinance," "microenterprise," and "microentrepreneur" to the internationally used term "microcredit." See id. The difficulty of finding evidence to support this proposition directly is perhaps attributable to a semantic choice designed to remove the stigma of charity or entitlement from these programs. In addition to overtly coercive fraudulent money-lending operations, such as loansharks, there are subtler swindlers that either resemble traditional finance arrangements common in immigrant communities, or appear facially harmless. The most common frauds are the Ponzi scheme 1 4 and its derivative versions. Basically, investors are promised artificially high dividends when, in fact, new investors' contributions provide the dividends of earlier investors. 147 There is usually no actual capital production other than continually raising new funds. 1 48 A variation of the Ponzi scheme is the pyramid, or airplane,' 49 scheme in which investors receive compensation for bringing in new investors. 50 Like the Ponzi scheme, pyramid schemes are illegal in most states.' 51 Another version is the birthday club 52 in which new recruits make gifts of money to current members under the impression that future recruits will in turn make gifts of money to them.
53 Interestingly, many such clubs limit membership to women.
54
Generally, Ponzi schemes do not represent as great a threat to microfinance operations, as they generally involve smaller amounts of money because, if the victims were required to put up large sums of money to participate, it is unlikely that they would need the services of a microlender1 55 There is room for a certain amount of confusion of Ponzi schemes with their legitimate cousin, the rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA). Essentially, a ROSCA is a group of individuals who come together to make regular contributions to a joint fund.1 56 The joint fund is then distributed to one member of the group who then repays the loan in further monthly 145. Eaton, supra note 139, at Bl. 146. "This scheme takes its name from Charles Ponzi, who in the late 1920s was convicted for fraudulent schemes he conducted in Boston." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed.
2004).
147. Id.
Id.
149. An airplane scheme is simply a pyramid scheme with titles assigned to the investors such as pilot, co-pilot, navigator, stewardess, passenger, depending on how close the investor is to winning a pay-out. See, e.g., New York v, Riccelli, 540 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1989 Tandas are often administered privately, as members may be undocumented.1
6 This reluctance to turn to the authorities for help increases the risk that members of a tanda will fall victim to fraud, but such occurrences are apparently rare.' 16 Professor Carlos Velez-Ibanez, a professor of anthropology at the University of California, Riverside, who studies tandas, describes a group cohesion similar to the peer pressure mechanism that drives repayment under Grameen microlending:
If you bug out on somebody, all of the other relationships also vibrate. That is, your cousin's going to know about it, your aunt's going to know about it, the people that you go to school with are going to know about it and your reputation then goes down the tubes and you won't be invited to the wedding, to the baptism or to Aunty Maria's 50th golden anniversary. 162
Other groups use ROSCAs similar to the tanda to start and maintain small businesses; Caribbean cultures call the arrangement en susu and the Vietnamese hui.
63
Korean and Ethiopian immigrants also have similar financial programs.' 64 While these immigrant ROSCAs resemble Grameen microlending in form and function, it should be kept in mind that these groups are typically no larger than ten to fifteen persons,1 65 and each group has no support beyond its membership. 1 66 Proponents of microcredit urge that it is equally applicable in the United States as it is in rural South Asia.' 67 Others do not believe the transition will be so smooth. 1 programs. 169 Before examining those studies, this Note will address the general development of microfinance in the United States.
Microfinance is often defined in the United States as "a sole proprietorship, partnership or family business that has fewer employees, [without] access to the commercial banking sector, [utilizing] a loan of less than $25,000 to start or expand a business that usually grosses less than $250,000 per year." 170 In fact, "microenterprise development" covers a vast spectrum of programs that reflect the purposes and values of their designers and clients.17 "Over 750 microenterprise programs and supporting programs now exist in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico. In 2000, the majority of these programs assisted 99,945 individuals, of which 9,800 were borrowers. "' 172 There are an estimated two million microentrepreneurs currently working in the United States.
173 Self-employment has grown in prominence due to layoffs and downsizing in the current U.S. economy. 174 Microfinance in the United States resonates with the American psyche, 1 75 even though the benefits of microfinance manifest themselves in largely unpredictable ways.' 76 Perhaps the most important side-effect of microfinance, especially where it allows a family to move out of poverty, is the ability to accumulate wealth. This, in turn, leads to, among other things, improved household stability, an increase in social and political participation and influence, and an enhancement of child welfare. 177 Furthermore, microcredit provides the means for some to break the cycle of economic dependency and poverty by providing both economic literacy and self-esteem. 178 This in turn leads to family and community development.
79
Despite these optimistic possibilities, some observers have noted that it is irresponsible to expose poor people to the vagaries of market economics, 18°e specially when moving from government assistance to self-employment may 
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microlending programs are organized as tax-exempt charitable or educational entities under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 20 1 In order to qualify for 501(c)(3) status, the program must be "organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable .. .or educational purposes. ' ' 2 0 2 The word "charitable" comprises "relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged, advancement of education, and promotion of social welfare through organizations formed to lessen neighborhood tensions, eliminate prejudice and discrimination, or combat deterioration or juvenile delinquency.
0 3
The Community Block Grant Development Program, which involves grants of aid from the Department of Housing and Urban Development20 4 to "carry out a wide range of community development activities directed toward revitalizing neighborhoods, economic development, and providing improved community facilities and services," 20 5 now recognizes microfinance programs as eligible recipients.
2 06 However, some groups are reluctant to accept federal monies out of concern over the loss of local control. 20 7 Other statutes that affect microenterprise programs deal with consumer law and credit-reporting practices. 2°s The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 2°9 concerns the computation of annual lending rates and how this information is communicated to the consumer. 210 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 21 In Hawthorne v. Olympia Fields, 223 the Women's Self Employment Project entered as amicus curiae on behalf of a client who sought a zoning change to allow her to conduct a child daycare business. This case was critical because it not only affected microentrepreneurs' ability to work in one of the more popular spheres of microenterprise, but it also affected microentrepreneurs in need of child care. The "WSEP's interest in home-based child care stems from a desire to provide quality child care for low-income women, thereby helping welfare recipients become self sufficient, and from helping welfare recipients and other low-income women achieve a living wage through work as a home day care provider."
224
In the case at bar, Sonya and Marcus Hawthorne purchased a house in Olympia Fields (the Village), intending to use it as a day care facility. 2 25 The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services approved their license, but the Village denied them a zoning permit. 226 The Village cited the fact that daycare facilities were outside the "home occupation" exception of businesses allowed in residential zones.
227
Businesses falling outside of the "home occupation" exception include " [o] 
A. Findings of Studies of Microfinance in the United States
The earliest study this Note considers organizes microlenders in one of two ways: either as a subsidiary of a larger agency or corporation, or as a taxexempt nondepository community development financial institution.
'
Significantly, microlenders falling in the latter category were unregulated lenders, and investor funds were uninsured. 2 32 The majority of groups in the study used the Grameen peer-lending model with loans ranging between $8,000
and $20,000.
23
' Among the study's findings were the importance of the peerlending model, which was purported to lower operating costs, 234 as well as the need for microlenders to be acquainted with the needs of their clientele. 23 5 "With first-hand knowledge of the local economy, group members are quick to assess the market for, and feasibility of, a business idea and often have valuable insights, connections, and business assistance to offer." 236 That being said, the researchers repeat the mantra that has echoed through almost every account of microcredit, except for those written by Muhammad Yunus: Microcredit is not a panacea. 237 However, "targeted microenterprise development-has tremendous potential for reaching deeply into disadvantaged populations. 238 Five years later, the second study reaffirmed the basic values of microcredit: "[r]ather than emphasizing a person's deficiencies when they enter the program, such as their lack of training for a certain job, or low educational attainment levels, microenterprise programs being by recognizing a person's strengths-the skills, aptitudes, interests, and experience that they already have.", 239 Most of the programs studied were funded primarily through The final study, the Self-Employment Learning Project (SELP), is a culmination of a five-year survey of microentrepreneurs from 1992 to 1996.243 The key finding was that more than seventy-two percent of the poor microentrepreneurs "gained in household income during the five-year period, and more than one-half were able to move out of poverty.", 244 A number of respondents were also able to discontinue government assistance. 245 Household assets rose by $13,623 on average, with the greatest increases among poor respondents ($15,909) . One of the more surprising results of the study was the large fraction of households with assets in excess of $10,000.24 "It is primarily the value of their real estate that accounts for the relatively high level of average assets for these respondents., 247 Also, despite their relative income levels, microentrepreneurs who participated in the survey achieved higher average levels of education than microentrepreneurs who were unable to participate, or members of the poor non-microentrepreneur control group.
248
Beyond these statistics, there are numerous first-hand accounts of how well microcredit can work (even though it cannot work for everyone), including that of Gloria Davis from Chicago, Illinois:
[M]y cousin was an underpaid secretary and I was a welfare mother sewing bridesmaids' dresses at home. All we needed was $3,000 to open the dress shop we've been dreaming about since we were kids. But we couldn't get a bank to even talk to us. Thanks to the Women's Self-Employment Project, we are now co-owners of the Neo Emporium. We have determination and a good business plan and with the grace of God, we're going to make it. 
20061
And, more recently, a twenty-three year old microentrepreneur said:
Through a local microenterprise program I learned about how I could start my own business .... I had experience cleaning houses for $25 a day so I thought, why not start my own business doing that. In my work with the literacy program my reading level increased from the third grade to the eighth grade. I haven't been on welfare in six years. I can read to my kids and we read the Bible everyday. I can now earn $200 a day. I make $48,000 a year and my goal is to make $60,000. I don't panic anymore. I feel great. I have confidence in myself. 250 Microcredit programs have also reached out to people whose potential might not be as readily apparent as in the examples above. In this case, the success story belongs to a recovering alcoholic homeless veteran:
He is now in the tenth week of Faith Ministry's program where he has learned about marketing, accounting, legal requirements, and business regulations. A volunteer lawyer has agreed to help him structure his business, assist him with getting the appropriate business licenses, and, along with the microenterprise program staff, help him apply for a $ 1000 loan for tools and equipment and business start-up expenses. The lawyer, also a Vietnam Veteran, has agreed to serve as Joe's personal mentor. . . . He attributes his current successes-sobriety, temporary housing, participating in a microenterprise program-to the possibility that he can start something on his own and try to reunite with his family. 251 Finally, microcredit has also helped noncitizens to strengthen their families and communities:
When Carlos Aldana came to the United States from Ibague, Columbia, 11 years ago, he worked at three jobs... His first $1,000 loan from Accion helped him buy a van to make deliveries; later, larger loans helped him by a tiny ca.f.. and to expand the production of corn cakes known as arepas. Today, Mr. Aldana employs 11 workers in his arepa factory.. 
B. Microfinance and Welfare Reform
The SELP study is also the first completed in the wake of Welfare Reform and the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). 2 3 Under the previous welfare regime, income caps militated against participation in microcredit programs. 254 Families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) lost their benefits if their assets exceeded $1,500.25' No distinction was made between personal assets and money obtained through loans or the value of capital investment, nor could welfare recipients deduct principal 256 repayments as business expenses. 2 6 Since loans were included under the heading of assets, a microloan of $2,000 could result in a loss of AFDC benefits. 257 "It [took] a giant leap of faith for an AFDC mother to forego the security of a monthly welfare check-not to mention Medicaid health coverage for her family.
The PRWORA dramatically changed the way federal guarantees of assistance to the nation's poorest children had been delivered over the last six decades. 259 "Most notably, the law prohibits states from using federal block grant funds to assist a family for more than five years... and requires adults to be engaged in work within two years or receiving assistance, or sooner at the state's option.,, 26 0 On the bright side, PRWORA eliminated the federallymandated income exclusions and asset caps that had caused problems under the old regime.
26 1 A further advantage of PRWORA and the implementation of state TANF programs are the provisions that grant states broad discretion over microenterprise programs. 26 2 Of course, this discretion can be used either advantageously or disadvantageously. For example, states face escalating participation rates in order to avoid TANF penalties. 263 Not all employment initiatives qualify; therefore, "a state may be hesitant to allow involvement in microenterprise activities unless the state is confident that allowing such activities will not put the state at risk of failing to meet the required participation rate., ' 264 Also, this does not account for those for whom microcredit programs are not a viable option: estimates place the number of 253. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996 
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welfare recipients who are able to benefit from self-employment at only five to ten percent. 265 The picture grows dimmer when one considers the non-entrepreneurial working poor in the aftermath of welfare reform. The focus is almost solely on getting people into jobs no matter what the wage or quality of work. 26 It was estimated that in order for the economy to absorb one million former welfare recipients, the bottom thirty percent of workers, those earning less than $7.19 267 per hour, would suffer an eleven percent wage drop or face displacement. "The working poor will end up even poorer." 26 8 Microenterprise advocates have developed a number of recommendations to maximize the chances of microenterprise success. 269 The first calls for a minimum of six months job training and two years business development to be granted to people transitioning from welfare to work. Additionally, training programs should be developed to partner workers with microenterprises to supplement their 270 incomes. While these are valid recommendations, it has become increasingly important to find ways to extend the reach of successful microcredit programs to aid as many of the working poor as possible. Section InI of this Note suggests a means of increasing revenues, counterintuitively, by adopting banking practices that will allow microlenders to lower their interest rates.
D.
Microfinance: Costs and Problems
Much of the early literature on microcredit mentions the low default rates. 271 These low default rates and the corresponding claims of selfsufficiency on the part of microcredit programs 272 appear to be largely illusory. The average loss rate for microloans in the United States is above ten percent. 27 3 Microcredit advocates must come to terms with the fact that microcredit is costlier than other forms of credit. 274 The Edgcomb study reported that the average loan costs $1.47 per dollar lent to make and manage the loan, with costs ranging between $0.67 and $2.95.275 A board member of a Los Angeles microenterprise program asked, when confronted with a similar See, e.g., McKenna , supra note 21, at A26. "A loan repayment rate of 94 to 98 percent shows that people previously labeled as not credit-worthy are indeed bankable. They make up in industry and ingenuity what they lack in capital." Id.
272. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 139, at B 1. "Because almost all the money gets repaid, it can be reused, making microcredit programs very cost-effective, proponents say. Some programs even make enough money from their lending to cover their costs." Id.
273. EDGCOMB, supra note 77, at 59. 274. MCLENIGHAN, supra note 42, at 9. 275. EDGCOMB, supra note 77, at 3.
[Vol. 16:2 cost-to-loan ratio: "Instead of investing so much effort and time into iicroenterprise programs, why don't we just hire a helicopter, fly over the target neighborhoods, and throw the money out of the window? '276 Of course, as related above, there is more to microenterprise than merely banking, and the anecdote ends happily: "seeing firsthand the broad range of impact that the microenterprise program had on individuals, especially in developing 'human capital' (including self-esteem, confidence, and the drive to obtain financial self-sufficiency) this same board member became an enthusiastic convert... ,,277 A collateral effect of the high transactional costs involved in handling such loans is the difficulty in turning a profit without charging high interest rates. 278 Despite this persistent enthusiasm, major challenges remain. Perhaps the three greatest challenges are the need for health care coverage for microentrepreneurs and their families, a financial cushion, and ongoing technical assistance. 279 The lack of health care is especially poignant, as the sickness of an entrepreneur or a close relative can destroy an otherwise successful microenterprise: "[m]y sister on the first floor, she didn't have anyone else to help her... she's in a wheelchair and is a dialysis patient. Ijust couldn't walk away from her., 280 Perhaps these problems can be remedied by variations of the Bangladeshi adaptations of Grameen H outlined previously. "Generally, all programs are urged to offer clients access to credit through innovative bank and other linkages... .,,28 1 The question becomes how much programs are willing to experiment and how much risk they are willing to assume. The next section explores concepts of Islamic banking law, the implementation of which can allow microlenders the opportunity to offer loans at lower interest rates and afford microentrepreneurs the ability to set aside the difference for health coverage or a rainy day fund.
III. MICROCREDIT AND EQUITY LENDING.
A. Applications of Equity Lending Without Interest 2 82
The past twenty years have seen tremendous growth in Islamic SYSTEM 68 (1986) (noting that equity lending "not only distribute[s] equitably the return on total investment between the financier and the entrepreneur, but also transfer[s] a fair share of the risk of the risks of investment to the financier instead of putting the whole burden on the entrepreneur.").
banking. 283 Estimated worldwide deposits surpass $80 billion in more than forty-five countries. 284 By 1999, the annual turnover was estimated at $70 billion, and it was projected to surpass $100 billion by 2000.285 Paradoxically to the Western mind, these results have been achieved in a system that prohibits the charging and payment of interest.
28 6 The Koran prohibits the practice of usury. 287 Whether this ban covers only the charging of exorbitant interest or the charging of any interest whatsoever is the subject of scholarly debate. 288 The rejection of interest centers on the perceived injustice of a borrower compelled to return more than he borrowed. 289 The use of paper money, credit cards, and checks is also'considered to be a form of usury as it contributes to inflation. 29 Wealth is accumulated through investment and mutually agreed upon ventures. 9 1 Islamic law imposes two requirements on such enterprises: (1) each investor has an equal voice in decision-making, regardless of amount invested; and (2) Rather than charging and paying interest, traditional Islamic banking systems are based either on the sharing of profit and loss or the charging of a pre-arranged fee. 297 Of the former group, the two most relevant for possible microcredit application are mudaraba, or trustee financing, and musharaka, or equity participation. 298 Of the latter group, murabaha, or cost plus markup, is the most relevant. 299 The main difference between the two categories is that for trustee financing and equity participation, the return is variable and is calculated at the end of the loan period, or for longer loans, at fixed periods.
3 00
In none of these situations may a contract be negotiated to provide a fixed rate of return. 3 '
Mudaraba
Under mudaraba, or trustee financing, as it shall be called for the remainder of this Note, each partner agrees to a fixed share of the profits based on a contractual agreement. 3 0 2 Neither the gross nor the net returns may be predetermined. 3°3 Losses must be shared equally by all partners. 3° A modem application of trustee financing emends the traditional arrangement by allowing the ratio of return to be negotiated between the partners at the outset of the venture. 
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arrangement, with financial risk completely on the lender, banks would be more circumspect in their lending practices, thus eliminating the need to charge interest."' 8 This does not sound like the kind of argument that would win over many converts in the banking industry, but it is applicable to microlending. Unlike Islamic banking, where there is an outright ban on interest regardless of amount, microlenders could assume part of the loan risk through trustee financing. In exchange for part of the profit of the microentrepreneur's business, the microlender can reduce the interest it charges to the microentrepreneur. As the microentrepreneur returns for further loans, the interest rate can be raised or lowered according to the health of their repayment history. The lower the risk of default, the more burden of risk the lender should be able to shoulder.°9
The trustee financing model is not without its disadvantages. Chief among them is the uncertainty of profit and the subsequent difficulty of calculating share returns. 310 Under this type of contract arrangement, the lender and borrower are partners. At first, the lender controls all the shares and is entitled to 100% of the profits. 31 ' As each loan installment is repaid, the borrower buys control of shares, simultaneously increasing his share and decreasing the lender's share of the profits. 3 t 2 This continues until the borrower controls 100% of the profits. At this point, the loan is paid in full.
13
The repayment system is complex enough without taking market fluctuations into consideration. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, at least in a microcredit context, borrowers may not keep accurate and detailed records. 1 4 Dealing with profit share payment under trustee financing might also pose a problem for people with no exposure to Islamic banking practices. In fact, "the acceptability of [this] model depends rather heavily on whether such an agreement is in accordance with Islamic banking principles. 3 1 5 One might argue that, since an important component of microcredit is the training and support that accompanies it, borrowers can be trained to work effectively with bookkeeping for purposes of profit share calculation.
3 16 This, however, leads to the question of where the microlender case workers will get their training. "The margin for error is considerable given that a single loan officer often manages 100-200 borrowers. 3 1 7 308. SHORT 
Murabaha
Under murabaha, or cost plus markup, the lender actually purchases the capital goods the borrower needs and would have otherwise borrowed money to purchase. 318 The borrower repays the lender the price of the goods plus an additional fee to cover administrative costs. 31 9 Cost plus markup is one of the most common forms of Islamic banking practice. 320 It is used to obtain machinery, raw materials, and finished goods. 32 1 Loan repayment under this system is easier to grasp and, subsequently, easier to predict. Something similar to cost plus markup is already practiced in the United States. As a means to protect against borrower bankruptcy, microlenders will sometimes take a security interest in goods purchased with the loan money. 3 22 While this approximates a murabaha arrangement, it is technically different because there is no corresponding markup on the capital goods.
323
Cost plus markup seems more conducive to Grameen banking, as well. A Yemeni microfinance program started in 1997 grew within two years to an active membership of 1,000, with $150,000 in loans outstanding and a turnaround of one week. 324 The clients were "entrepreneurial poor in urban slum districts. 325 The program adopted the Grameen II innovations of loan insurance and increasingly larger loans.
326 Unlike the Bangladeshi model, only thirty percent of the Yemeni participants were women. 327 Because the markup is predetermined, this type of loan contract typically costs the borrower less. 328 Of course, under a trustee financing arrangement, the borrower could stand to earn a greater absolute amount of money, but there is no guarantee. Also, some prefer the markup system because of its inherent transparency. 329 In fact, it is easier to enforce because the lender owns the goods until the final installment is paid, 33° in a sort of lending layaway. Trustee microlenders is significantly lower than in places such as Bangladesh, this concern is not as great yet it remains valid. Id. 
318.
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financing is more difficult to police. Due to its complexity and unpredictability, honest error, negligence, or malfeasance may go undetected. 3 However, it retains the advantage of all parties sharing in the profits, and in some respects, the losses, equally. 332 These tradeoffs are important to keep in mind. Although writing about Islamic banking in particular, Dhumale and Sapcanin make a point applicable to all forms of financing when they write that program must account "for the ... risks of a particular methodology not only to the program but also to borrowers. 3 33
A. Application of Equity Lending in the United States
To a very limited extent, equity microlending already exists in the United States. 3 3 One example is the Philadelphia Development Partnership, which offers zero-interest loans to Muslim microentrepreneurs based on tenets of Islamic banking. 335 It is important to keep in mind that even though hypothetical microloans can be disbursed using Islamic banking theory, loans to non-Muslims need not be zero-interest. In exchange for a limited share of the microentrepreneur's profits, the lender could offer a reduced interest rate that would both ease the burden of repayment and give the lender a more vested interest in the entrepreneur's success. Any lender profit realized from the transaction could be funneled into technical assistance generally, or into specific health or rainy-day accounts for the particular entrepreneur.
336
B. Challenges to Wider Adoption of Equity Microlending in the United States
The three main challenges to the wider adoption of equity microlending in the United States are anti-Islamic sentiment, 337 the complexity of the equity microlending, 338 and, in a broader sense, the negative scrutiny placed on those who even this "softer" version of microenterprise cannot help. 339 The first obstacle seems hardly worth mentioning but, considering the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the topic should be addressed, however briefly. Microlenders, one would hope, are socially conscious humanitarians who place the welfare of their clients above any prejudices they may harbor. As for the 331 microentrepreneurs, their main concern would most likely be successfully starting their businesses and rising from poverty. 340 The second challenge, however, is much more daunting. As shown above, Islamic banking models are highly complex and counterintuitive to people who are accustomed to operating under interest-driven finance. In fact, the charts in the appendix depicting the distribution of borrower and lender profits are artificially simplified with a fixed periodic profit of $1,000 to demonstrate the basic mechanism of profit sharing. 34 1 However, it should be kept in mind that microcredit is much more complicated and labor intensive than conventional banking; "groups must think seriously about commitment and be prepared for the long haul because microenterprises are expensive to operate and involve a large time commitment for practitioners." 342 In her legal guide to microenterprise, Jones details a number of planning issues that practitioners have identified as important to consider. 343 One such recommendation is a call for greater transparency in reporting:
If a bank services the microloans, it is important for the bank and the microenterprise program staff to maintain close communication. Negotiate with the bank for timely reports on borrowers' payments. These reports should be weekly or biweekly; monthly reports are insufficient because they allow for extended unsupervised periods of default.
The microenterprise programs need to know immediately if borrowers are having trouble making loan payments.3" For the program experimenting with equity microlending, the suggestion to maintain transparency becomes paramount. Not only must borrowers be aware of non-standard financial arrangements, the financial institutions that back the loans must be even more aware. In this regard, equity microlending may be a viable option for only those microlenders who maintain complete control of their financial resources. 345 Finally, if equity lending has the positive benefit of opening microenterprise possibilities for a wider array of poor entrepreneurs, it might also have the unintended effect of bringing increased negative scrutiny to those persons who are unable to participate in microenterprise projects. Numerous factors, such as environmental, social, and psychological, have a bearing on an individual's ability to rise from poverty. 346 
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poverty as there are into poverty. '347 In her address before the microcredit summit, Hillary Clinton observed that "[iut is the individual human being willing to work hard who will be given the opportunity if that person takes responsibility to seek and find a better life for themselves [sic] . 348 The language of choice and responsibility of this quotation suggests that a person unable to work hard might be viewed as unwilling to work hard, and a moral stigma attaches to those who cannot benefit from microcredit. 349 In considering adaptations and improvements to the application of microcredit in the United States, it is important to keep in mind the admonition that is often repeated in the international context: "The United States and other donor nations should not place unrealistic conditions on their support for those who work micromiracles. Nor should they use this program as a substitute for other more basic ways of helping the poorest of the poor. Since its creation in the 1970s, microcredit has demonstrated both its simplicity and effectiveness. Banking on a person's potential rather than her credit or collateral has helped countless families worldwide to break free of poverty. Microcredit has also been successful in the United States; however, the transfer from the developing nation and agrarian village society to a highly regulated urban America has not been as smooth as microcredit proponents had originally envisaged. Still, the fundamental concepts of microcredit have proven highly adaptable in the new context. Central to microcredit' s success in the United States is the desire of microlenders and microentrepreneurs to see the system succeed. It is a moral force that transcends simple banking.
The goal of this Note is to suggest a further adaptation of the Grameen microcredit model. By incorporating elements of Islamic banking, specifically, techniques which would allow microlender to move away from dependence on high interest rates, the lenders could either offer lower rates to microentrepreneurs to cushion their introduction to self-employment or they could funnel the money into accounts which could provide health insurance or emergency funds for their borrowers.
The problems associated with such a project might make it impractical on a wide scale. The largest obstacle is the complexity and alien nature of interestfree banking. It is an experiment for only the most dedicated and dauntless 347. Id. (quoting Robert E. Friedman, Microenterprise as an Asset Building Strategy Among the Poor, Presentation at a Ford Foundation Conference at New York University (December 10-12, 1998) microlenders to undertake. However, it does provide an opportunity for microlenders to expand and shore up their clientele in certain key areas. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that for all its potential, microcredit is not a silver bullet to end poverty in the United States. That being said, it should also be remembered that microcredit is an option for only a fraction of the nation's poor people. Those who cannot be helped by microcredit must not be blamed for the limitations of the program.
